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ON THEORIES ABOUT ALIENATION OF JUS IN REM 
        IN THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN 
                       BY SEIZI TANAKA 
                 Assistant Professor,OsakaUniversity 
I 
   The problem which I intend to deal with in this article is how the 
theories about the transfer of jus in rem are designed as regulating the 
dealings of real property in the Civil Code of Japan. 
   There is no doubt that our Civil Code has been drafted under the 
strong influence of the Code Napoleon and the First Draft of German Civil 
Code except the part for Status, and also it is well-known that the in-
fluence has covered all the divisions of the law of real property which will 
be usually thought as being strictly under the traditional conditions depend-
ing on the historical foundation.* But it. is not the province of this article 
to explain that causes i.e. the social, economic and political elements for 
the formation of the Civil Code of Japan - especially such the cause as 
the request promoting the organization of the capitalistic economic system 
with a distinctive character after the Restoration of Japan. 
   Now, the Civil Code of Japan, Article 176 provides as following in 
regard to the transfer of jus in rem : "the acquisition of jus in rem and 
its alienation shall be valid merely by the expression of the intention of 
the parties," and besides Article 177 and 178 provide as following : "the 
acquisition the forfeiture or the shift of jus in rem upon real property 
shall not be set up against hird persons until they have been registered 
in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Registration," and "the 
transfer of jus in rem upon Chattels personal shall not be set up against 
third persons until they have been delivered." 
   These have just the same appearance as that of Code Napoleon. Thus, 
Art. 176 adove-mentioned seems to be correspondent with Art. 711, 1138 
  See, e.g. Kosehaker; Europa nd das Rornische R cht, 2. Au$. 1953. S. 131ff.
26 SEIZI TANAKA 
etc. in the Code Napoleon, and has the same appearance as if it provided the 
transfer of jus in rem should become operative merely by the expression of 
the obligatory intention which would be originally intending to produce 
the obligatory effect under the law of obligations without any external indi-
cation - "Willenstheorie" - and it seems to me that Art. 177 or 
178 is correspondent with Loi 23 mars 1855 or Art. 1141, Code Napoleon.* 
   But, in our judicial world there is a dispute about "the expression of 
the intention" provided in Art. 176 above-mentioned. That is: whether "the 
expression of the intention" should be appreciated as meaning the expres-
sion of the intention intending to produce the objective ffect under the law 
of real property or to produce the obligatory effect under the law of obligations. 
Of course there sre several transaction ("dingliche Geschaft") of which merely 
the former ("dingliche Willenserklarung") is thought as its essential ele-
ment without any relation to the latter ("obligatorische Willenserklarung") 
e.g. the giving of earnest-money and the delivery of loan for consumption. 
And if there is no particular agreement between the parties to make the trans-
fer of the ownership (or jus in rem) rely upon the transaction to trans-
fer the ownership (or jus in rem) in the bargain of a specific property, 
there arises a problem whether there arises the , effect of the transfer of 
the ownership (or jus in rem) merely by the existence of a obligatory tran-
saction of which the expression of the intention originally intending to pro-
duce only the obligatory effect under the law of obligations according the 
bargain is thought as the essential element. That is, in other words, whe-
ther to recognize the distinctive quality of the objective transaction ("ding-
liche Geschaft")** in such a case. 
                       II
[A] The constructive structure of the decisions and the influential theory 
seems to require only the causal contract but the objective expression of 
* this section provides the good faith of the second transferee as the requisite. And now 
it is almost appreciated as to Art. 2279, but formerly there was pretty many theories 
that asserted the delivery of personal property as the requisite for the transfer of the 
estate. (Aubry et Rau; Cours de Droit Civil Francais. 6. edit. 1935. t. II p. 78. n..7.) 
** "Dingliche Geschaft" as the conceptual construction on our civil law is different from 
that of the German Civil Code, see post. p. 29, 31 and the following.
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the intention ("dingliche Willenserklarung"). And their foundation is as 
following, : our Civil Code is based on the principle of "Willenstheorie" 
like the Code Napoleon; and when the provisions of our Civil Code are con-
strued and applied, it is rational to find the criterion for practical construc-
tion in the same manner as the Code Napoleon. And then they think; 
the provision of Art. 176 of our Civil Code only make it -clear that it shall 
be supposed that when a person has acted with the purpose to transfer 
jus in rem, in principle he shall have the intention intending to produce 
the effect of the transfer of jus in rem. 
[B] The other school recognizes the distinctive quality of the objective 
transaction ("dingliche Geschdit") and its foundation seems to be as follow-
ing. 
   (i) One bases on the foundation that the obligatory transaction must be 
distinguished from the objective transaction as to the concept of the legal 
requisite ("rechtlicher Tatbestand"). According to this theory, the transfer 
of jus in rem must arise only as the effect of the expression of the inten-
tion intending to transfer itself, because the expression of the intention to 
effect the transfer of jus in rem must be distinguished from the expression 
of the intention to produce a relation of obligation between the parties, 
as far as the structure of our Civil Code is based on the modern distinc-
tion between jus in rem ("Sachenrecht") and jus in personam ("Obligationen-
recht"). And it is not sensible as a commentation to find the existence 
of the expression of the objective intention in such a transaction like the 
obligatory transaction even if ultimately it would be supposed as its own 
purpose to effect the transfer of jus in rem. 
   (ii) One is tried to comment from therelation to other provisions and 
the systemes of our Civil Code. The following matters are its foundations. 
   (a) Exceptio non adimpleti contractus. As to the mutual relation of per-
formance dueing to the relativity of the bilateral contract, Art. 533 pro-
vides that the vendor shall be able to refuse to perform his obligation until 
the money has been payed. If the ownership was transfered to the pur-
chaser at the same time when the contract has been concluded, such a 
defence as above-mentioned becomes to be meaningless because the purchaser 
should be able to possess the object by rei vindicatio. For instance, there
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is not such provisions in the Code Napoleon and it maintains impartiality 
between parties of the bilateral contract by making use of lien instead of 
that defence.* Accordingly some of this school that comments Art. 176 
samely as the Code Napoleon think : the case of the bilateral contract make 
an exception. 
   (b) The validity of the bargain of the thing belonging to other. No pro-
vision in our Civil Code makes the bargain of the thing belonging to other 
invalid in contrast with the Code Napoleon, Art. 1599** but rather ecognizes 
the validity of it in Art. 560. Accordingly the bargain in our Civil Code 
produces merely a relation of obligation and it can not be commented as 
the covenant to transfer the ownership (la convention translatife de la pro-
priete). 
   (c) The system of unjust enrichment (Art. 703-708). It is the premise of 
this system that the causal and obligatory transaction is distinguished from 
the transfer of jus in rem and they arise from , the distinct transactions 
both. Especially the provision of Art. 705: "if a person pays for a liability 
with notice of no-existence of the liability when it has been paid, he shall 
not able to claim the restitution of it" can not be appreciated if the 
ownership of what has been paid has transfered to the other party without re-
ference to the existence of the obligatory contract. 
   (d) The gift not by the instrument. Art. 550 provides "the gift not 
by the instrument shall be able to be set aside by the party except he 
part which has been performed". This provision becomes nearly meaning-
less in connection with the restrictive provision of it if the ownership of 
the specific property should have been transfered merely by the agreement 
of gift. 
   (e) One bases on the actual circumstances of the daily dealings. The 
problem whether the obligatory agreement (obligatorischer Vertrag) which 
intends ultimately to transfer jus in rem should be constructed as contain-
ing the expression of the intention to transfer jus in rem is to be settled 
by the actual and timehonoured circumstances of our dealings but merely 
   The Code Napoleon, Art. 1612, 1613 
 * The theories i different each other as to the commentation of this provision: some 
of them comment it void as to purchaser and other comment it as dissolution.
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by the conceptual structure as to the contents and the effects of the expres-
sion of the intention. Now usually the ownership does not transfer by 
entering into a contract which is only a agreement even if the object is 
specific. Because the problem when the ownership transfer to the purchaser 
by what transaction is almost decided by the time and the conditions as 
to the delivery of the object (or the vacating of land or house) by the 
vendor or as to the payment of the price by the purchaser in our real 
life. For instance, our usual customs of the transfer of real property is that 
the purchaser meet with the vendor and pays to him the price at the same 
time when its alienation has registered. 
[C] It seems to be comprehensible as following in respect to (i) and (ii), 
(c) in what is stated in B as the foundation of the latter theory. 
   (a) Our Civil Code is systematized by two elementalconcepts - jus in 
rem and jus in presonam - like the German Civil Code. Thus, there the 
expression of the objective intention (dingliche Willenserklarung) is distinct 
from the expression of the obligatory intention (obligatorische Willenserkla-
rung). For, the both is different in respect to the effective requisite tc. 
in the legal requisite (rechtlicher Tatbestand), for instance, it is necessary 
for the expression of the objective intention (dingliche Willenserklarung) 
that the object is real and specific and the person who expresses the 
intention has jus disponeidi. However it is not essential but only convenient 
and necessary to make distinction between the two concepts - "dingliche Will-
enserklarung" and "obligatorische Willenserklarung", because it is not neces-
sary to have such formal requisites* to make the former effective as provided in 
the German Civil Code for "dingliche Geschdit" that is stated in the ex-
planation of our Civil Code. Originally the both - jus in rem and jus in 
personam - are merely a ideal existence as a ideal imagery for a thought 
("une chose immaterialle, une relation ideale"). And it is not necessary to 
be analysed into the expression of the objective intention (dingliche Will-
enserklarung) and the expression of the obligatory intention (obligatorische 
Willenserklarung) and be thought separately for a actual expression f inten-
tion if it intends to produce the effect o transfer jus in rem in addition 
  It is the registration ("Eintragung in das Grundbuch") for real property and the deli-
very ("Ubergeben") for chattels personal, with a agreement ("Einigung") to transfer jus in rem.
30 SEIZI TANAKA 
to the effect to create a relation of obligation. And so, the expression of 
the objective intention is not necessarily made independently and separately 
from the expression of the obligatory intention. That is, the former can 
be included by the latter. 
   (,6') It is not necessarily the premise for the principle of unjust enrich-
ment that the objective transaction (dingliche Geschaft) should be distin-
guished from the obligatory transaction (obligatorische Geschaft), but the princi-
ple intends to regulate enrichment if it was unjust in the point of the legal 
order. Thus, nevertheless the civil law of France is without regard to the 
distinctive quality of the objective transaction, the Code Napoleon provides 
not merely as to administration and money paid under mistake in the chapter 
of "des quasicontrats" (Art. 1371-1381), but also there is a general theory that 
is called "enrichissement sans cause" and its theory has borrowed from "actio 
de in rem verso." So, the latter and the theory on "payment de l'indu" are 
in uniformity each other with the idea of "enrichissement injuste". There, the 
system of money paid under mistake is called only a application f the theory 
of "causa". To explain in detail, the Code Napoleon, Art. 1235 provides that 
the existence of the obligation should be the requisite for any money paid 
and any money paid without the existence of the obligation should be 
restituted as it is to be void. Accordingly, we can understand, in the 
case claiming to restitute money paid under mistake, the ownership of what 
is paid is in the hand of claimer. And there is no doubt that this theory 
should be applicable to the case in which the contract is void as it mi-
sses "cause" or has "fausse causa" or "causa illicite",* or which is set aside 
for some reasons. If we may consider as afore-said, it may be just to 
say that the system of unjust enrichment can not take as its own premise 
the distinction of the objective transaction and the obligatory transaction. 
It may be merely a literalism to comment that the special types of unjust 
enrichment which is provided in Art. 705 above-montioned an following 
to Art. 708 of our Civil Code take the premise that the ownership of what 
pay is once transfered to the other party. 
* The Code Napoleon, Art. 1108, 1131, 133.
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                        III 
   How can we dissolve the dispute above-mentioned ? The explanation 
stated in II [C] (a) above-mentioned is merely a description that theoreti-
cally it is able to produce the both effects to create a relation of obligation 
and to transfer jus in rem for one tranction, but it dose not dissolve the 
problem whether "the expression of the intention" provided in Art.. 176 
of our Civil Code means the expression of the obligatory intention (obliga-
torische Willenserklarung) or the expression of the objective intention (ding-
liche Willenserklarung).; Now "Willenstheorie" as to the transfer of jus in 
rem that is adopted in the Code Napoleon means that the effect shall be 
produced by only the parties' expression of the intention without any external 
indication and the transaction to. transfer jus in rem shall be included in 
the relation of obligation as a mere conduct. On the other hand, the. for-
malism that is adopted in the German Civil Code is a theory to suppose 
that the effect to transfer jus in rem should be produced by a settled and 
external indication with the expression of the intention and the transaction 
to transfer jus in rem should be distinguished as a genuine transcation from, 
the relation of obligation. Will be just to conclude that the transaction to 
deal jus in rem in our Civil Code is included in the relation of obligation 
merely from the foundation that the provision of Art. 176 of our Civil 
Code originate in "Willenstheorie" of the Code Napoleon ? It will be neces-
sary to consider upon the following two points for the finding of the mean-
ing of Art. 176 and the constructive structure of "the expression of the 
intention" provided in it. 
(i) As any provision of the civil code relates closely to other provisions 
and performs its operation as a part of the code that is unified systemati-
cally, the characteristic of any provision which is a part of the unified code 
can not be realized without respect o its relation to the structure of the code. 
In this meaning, the characteristic of our Civil Code seems to be similar 
to rather that of the German Civil Code than the French, because the 
legal structure of bargain (Art. 555 and the following) that relates closely 
to 'the law regulating the dealings of property is supposed to create merely 
a relation of obligation to transfer the property as the validity of the bar
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gain of the property belonging to others that has mentioned in II [B] (ii) 
(b), and it will be proper to say so in the legal structure of above II 
[B] (ii) (a) and (d). Therefore, we may suppose that there is other cha-
racteristic in Art. 176 of our Civil Code than the historical background 
of "Willenstheorie" as to the transfer of jus in rem in the French Civil 
Code in which Art. 176 originated. In other words, we may suppose that 
Art. 176 of our Civil Code does not mean that the transaction to transfer 
jus in rem should be included in that of obligation but that the acquisi-
tion and the transfer of jus in rem should be effective by the expression 
of the intention intending to transfer jus in rem without respect o such 
a settled and external formality as the transaction to transfer. Moreover 
we may suppose that it has originally belonged to the idea of the natural 
law that has asserted the absolutness of the personal intention and which 
will be found in the French Civil Code. 
   How may we deal the case in which it is not clear when the expres-
sion of the objective intention (dingliche Willenserklarung) has been done, 
if the expression of the intention in Art. 176 should be explained sub-
stantially as the expression of the objective intention ? And this is a pow-
erful foundation of the opposite opinions that conclude "dingliche Ges-
chaft" as a needless concept. 
(ii) The problem, about the expression of the intention provided in Art. 
176, when the effect tranfering jus in rem should be supposed to be pro-
duced by the expression of the objective intention, in the case of bargain 
of a specific property in which there is not the article to depend on the 
transaction to transfer for the alienation of jus in rem, is reduced to the 
problem when the expression of the intention intending to produce the effect 
to transfer jus in rem should be supposed to be taken from the explana-
tion of the parties' intention, except the cases in which the expression of 
the objective intention intending to transfer jus in rem is clearly distin-
guishable. And there is no doubt that the explanation of the parties' in-
tention relates to the customs in our actual dealings, in other words, the 
intentions of the general society. Now, there are many studies upon our, 
old customs in the actual dealings. According to them, there were the 
external indications for the transfer of the ownership according to the
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variety of the property; for instance, the seal of an office, the seal of 
relative or partner, the seal of Shoya,* or the recognition of an office 
for the bargains of cultivated fields or forests, and the licence of the 
town hall for the bargains of houses or building lands, and the delivery 
etc. for the bargains of chattels personal. And the ownerships were able 
to be transfered validly only by such external indications. At the present day 
still, it is sixty years since the enforcement of our Civil Code, ; the articles of 
the bill of sale that is made in the bargain of land orr house usually only int-
nd to produce the relation of the obligation respecting the trnsfer. And it 
seems to be the intention of the general public that ownership will not 
transfer usually until such a external indication as the delivery, of the 
property, the payment of the price or the registration appear. The payment 
and reception of the price will be the circumstances to presume that 
the vendor think he can not deal with the property at his option 
because he receives the money and the purchaser. think himself, the 
ownership should become into his hand because he pais the money. 
It is a priniciple that the expression of the intention intending to produce 
the effect to transfer jus in rem is taken with such conducts taking 
the external indications as the payment of the price, the delivery of the 
documents for registration and, the delivery, of the property, etc. - but, 
of course, the manner is not fixed., And it is rare that "dingliche 
Geschaft" above-mentioned is done together with the bargain. Thus, for such 
transaction is not fiexd in a formality as that in the German Civil Code 
but itself a independent existence,, we can say the transfer, of jus in 
rem "shall be valid merely by the expression of the intention of the 
parties". The above-mentioned will be in the intention of Art. 176 from 
the first. 
                         IV 
   By such explanation, of the transaction depending on the social and 
economic structure of the dealings as above-mentioned, the gap between the 
* It was a terminal organ in the governmental system of the Shogunate nd engaged in 
the general dministration of village .g. the allotment and the exaction of land-tax, the 
census registration a d the supervision of public-moral etc.
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norm for justice and the norm for conduct will become' to be supplid and 
the living law will appear with the compulsory power by the courts of 
justice. 
   Then, such "dingliche Geschdit" that explanatorily weorganize as above-
mentioned has not necessarily such fixed formality as the registration r the 
delivery in the German Civil Code. 
   Therefore, there arise following complicated problems between the parties 
and third persons in relation to the, principle of the publicity of jus in 
rem ' ("Publizitdtsprinzip" ). 
   While "dingliche Geschaft" in which merely . the expression f the ob-
jective intention (dingliche Willenserklarung) is supposed to be its element 
produced the effect o acquisite or transfer 'jus in rem, the acquisition of
jus in rem shall not be set up against third persons until it has been re-
gistered in the case of the real property or delivered in the case of chat-
tels personal, by the provision of Art. 177 and 178. In other words, while 
by the provision of Art. 176 the effect o transfer jus in rem between 
parties reflects in the relation to third persons, the transfer of jus in rem 
shall not be set up against the particular third persons without he requisite 
for setting up against them. For instance, suppose a case in which the pur-
chaser of a real property paid the money and therefore there was the ex-
pression of the objective intention between the parties but the vendor selled 
the same property to a third person until the first purchaser had been re-
gistered. In such double conveyance, there are two valid legal relations of the 
dealings of jus in rem. But one of them should be denied because each 
of them should be the obstruction for, the existence or, the realization of
the dealings" to each other. Logically, it must be of necessity hat "third 
persons" in Art. 177 or 178 mean the person who is in the limits re-
stricted by the intentions of the provisions and do'nt mean every third per-
sons except the parties and their representatives, b cause Art. 177 and 178 
are the restrictive provisions of Art. 176. Accordingly 'the tort-feasor is
not among "third persons". And the decisions and the influential' theorie 
assert hat "third persons" mean the third person who is in a valid rela-
tion of the dealing as to the same property, but -in the more srtict sense, 
he seems to be the person who acquires the objective directing power on
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the. same real property (or chattels personal) by a valid relation of dealings 
as to it and claims its effect himself. But then, there remains the questions 
how the ownership of the property which has been transfered can be 
transfered again from the former owner to a third person, and what the 
sentence of "shall not be set up" means. As to this problems, there are 
various views as following. 
    In a case in which there was a objective transaction between A and 
B and again jus in rem of the property was transfered from A to C until 
B has taken the requisite for setting up; 
    (i) In the relations between the parites or against hird persons, A does 
not become to be deprived of his right wholly and B does not become 
to be entitled to his right absolutely until B has taken the requisite for 
setting up his right. 
    (ii) The transfer of jus in rem between A and B is throughly effective 
in the relations between the parties or against hird persons, but its effect is 
overthrown by the denial of C ("Anfechtungsrecht") - the assertion of 
a fact by C that is not consistent with the transfer of jus in rem between 
A and B. 
    (iii) The transfer of jus in rem between A and B produces the perfect 
effect without the 'requisite for setting up but is void so far as against 
the interest of third persons. 
   According to the firsttheory, there remains the doubts how we may suppose 
the exclusive quality of jus in rem or B can exercise the claim originated 
from jus in rem ("dinglicher Anspruch") against a tort-feasor because 
both of A . and B is supposed to be the owner of the imperfect jus 
in rem in this theory. Moreover, this theory is not consistent with 
the import of Art. 176 at the point that the registration or the delivery 
is not merely the requisite for setting up but endowed with the efficacy 
to convert / a imperfect jus in rem into a perfect jus in rem, because it 
supposes that a imperfect jus in rem become a perfect jus in rem when 
the requisite for setting up is taken. According to the second theory, it 
results in that it excludes C from his own recognition of the `transfer of 
jus in rem between A and B. : Thus, according to the third theory, it will 
be proper to suppose that the effect of the transfer of jus in rem between A
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and B is voidable as to the third person C' who can assert its inefficiency, 
because Art. 177 and 178 are the restrictive provisions of Art. 176. Of course, 
C may recognize the effect of the transfer of jus in rem between A and B, be-
cause the concept of the word "voidable" is based on the consideration that 
the third person should be kept from a certain disadvantage. When the effect 
is recognized by C, the effect of the transfer of jus in rem between A and 
B becomes to be valid, while C becomes to be deprived of his right as 
to the property and merely can claim against A under the obligatory relation. 
Even if we consider it as above-mentioned, it seems to me that there re-
mains the doubt opposite to the standpoint of the modern law which draws 
a sharp line between jus in rem and jus in personam, that when jus in 
rem which is originally the absolute right has not the requisite for setting up 
become a relative right which is voidable as far as against a certain third 
person.* 
V 
   The theories as to the transfer of jus in rem in the Civil Code of 
Japan have been considered briefly in above-mentioned. And we can 
observe that there arise the gap between the actual transfer of jus in rem 
and the principle of publicity of jus in rem ("Publizitatsprinzip") that is 
intending to maintain third persons or the security of the dealings, 
because the objective transaction (dingliche Geschdit) is supposed to be 
take by only the expression of the objective intention (dingliche Willenserk-
larung) as its element but it is not connected with fixed formality. 
Hereafter, it will be necessary for us to have the inclination legislating 
the registration r the delivery not as the requisite for setting up but as 
the requisite for coming into existence. And there are vairous injurious 
effects dueing. to the registration that has not the public effect ("offentli-
cher Glaube") but the presumptive effect in our country, but this problem 
is not < treated in this article. Still, the publicity of the transfer is cracked 
in chattles real because constitutum possessorium is admitted as to. the deli-
very of chattels personal, but it does not come into question because the 
   For example, Colin et Capitant; Cours elementaire de Droit Civil Francais.4.ed. 1923. 
t. I v. 974. etc.
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the security of the dealings is maintained by the admission of acquisition 
de bonne foi. But, I must add to the distinctive quality of the objective 
transaction that the recognition of it does not mean to decide its effective-
ness regardless of the prior obligatory transaction (obligatorische Geschaft). 
In other words, whether the objective transaction is effected by the flaws 
in the causal relation as void or voidable is another problem. And this 
problem whether the effect of the objective transaction is subjected to the 
effect of the prior obligatory transaction will be published at the early oppor-
tunity. I hear that there is the provision in s. 100 of the Property Law 
of New York that provides that the- ownership of the presonal property 
transfer at the : same time when the bargain is concluded if it is specific*, 
but I don't know how it is constructed theoretically by the jurists. I 
intend to study it in future.
* Claude Lewy; The Code and Property (The Code Napoleon and the Common-Law 
World. 1956. edited by Bernard Schwartz. p. 175)
